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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
INCOME TAX: CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION-
Tax Benefit Rule Does Not Qualify the 
Explicit Nonrecognition of Gain Provision 
of Section 337-Anders v. 
Commissioner* 
D. B. Anders was the sole stockholder of D. B. Anders, Inc., an 
industrial service concern which rented supplies of laundered ap-
parel, coveralls, towels, and related textiles. In May 1961, the cor-
poration adopted a plan of complete liquidation and within twelve 
months sold substantially all of its operating assets, including the 
rental items, to another corporation which intended to carry on the 
same type of business. Of the gain from that sale, $233,000 was 
allocated to the rental items, the entire cost of which had been 
deducted by the company in the year of purchase as an ordinary and 
necessary business expense.1 In its income tax return for the tax-
able year ending July 31, 1961, the corporation reported a gain of 
$446,601.89 from the sale of its assets but claimed nonrecognition 
of the entire amount pursuant to section 337 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 (Code). That section provides that if a corporation 
adopts a plan of complete liquidation, and if it distributes all of its 
assets within twelve months from the date of the adoption of the 
plan, it shall recognize no gain or loss from the sale or exchange of 
property within that twelve month period.2 The Commissioner of 
• 48 T.C. 815 (1967), appeal docketed, 10th Cir., 7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 
70,701 [hereinafter principal case]. 
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a 
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable 
year in carrying on any trade or business." 
2. !NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 337: 
GAIN OR LOSS ON SALES OR EXCHANGES IN CONNECTION 
WITH CERTAIN LIQUIDATIONS 
(a) General Rule.-If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 
1954, and 
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such 
plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, 
less assets retained to meet claims, 
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or 
exchange by it of property within such 12-month period. 
(b) Property Defined.-
(!) In General.-For purposes of subsection (a), the term "property" does not 
include-
(A) stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind which 
would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand 
at the close of the taxable year •.•• 
(2) Nonrecognition with respect to inventory in certain cases.-Notwith-
standing paragraph (1) of this subsection, if substantially all of the property 
described in subparagraph (A) of such paragraph (1) which is attributable to a 
trade or business of the corporation is, in accordance with this section, sold 
or exchanged to one person in one transaction, then for purposes of subsection 
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Internal Revenue conceded the applicability of section 337 but 
contended that since the $233,000 gain allocated to rental items rep-
resented the recovery of a previously deducted amount, that amount 
was taxable under the tax benefit rule.3 The Tax Court, however, 
held that the entire gain qualified for nonrecognition under section 
337.4 It stated that when a corporation realizes gain from the liquida-
tion sale of assets the cost of which had been previously deducted by 
the corporation, the tax benefit rule does not operate as a limitation 
on the explicit nonrecognition provision of section 337.5 
Despite this case, however, and despite the explicit nonrecogni-
tion provisions of section 337, it can be contended that gain should 
be recognized as ordinary income6 in these circumstances. While 
there have been no cases in which the tax benefit rule itself was 
applied to override section· 337, courts have applied both the assign-
ment-of-income rationale7 and the clear-reflection-of-income doctrine8 
to override that section, and they have, in certain instances, engaged 
in interpretive gymnastics with the terms "sale or exchange"9 and 
(a) the term "property" includes-
(A) such property so sold or exchanged ••.• 
3. The so-called "tax benefit rule" is a product of administrative ruling, case law, 
and statute. The rule was first developed through court decisions. See Dobson v. 
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 
60 (7th Cir. 1940); Estate of William H. Block, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939). It was codified for 
certain limited situations in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § Ill, and then extended by Treas. 
Reg. § 1.111-l(a) (1968) to "all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made the basis 
of deductions from gross income for prior taxable years . . . ." According to the rule, 
an amount which represents a recovery of an item previously deducted must be 
included in the taxpayer's income to the extent that the deduction was of a tax benefit 
to him. 
The Commissioner might also have relied on Rev. Rul. 61-214, 1961-2 CUM. BULL. 
60. See note 5 infra. 
4. Principal case at 823. 
5. The principal case at 821-22 rejected Rev. Rul. 61-214, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 60. 
See Sales of Corporate Assets Under Section 337, 49 A.B.A.J. 297, 298 (1963); J. 
MERTENS, 2 LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 17.06 n.35.9b (rev. ed. 1967). Arent, 
Reallocation of Income and Expenses in Connection with Formation and Liquidation 
of Corporations, 40 TAXES 995, 1001 (1962); Boland, A Review of Developments Under 
Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 42 TAXES 676, 690-92 (1964); Grant, 
Some Pitfalls in a One-Year Liquidation, 12 UCLA L. Rev. 1135, 1138-39 (1965); Gutkin 
&: Beck, Section 337: IRA Wrong in Taxing, at Time of Liquidation, Items Previously 
Deducted, 17 J. TAXATION 146 (1962); Mandell, Twelve Month Liquidations and 
Collapsibility of Real Estate Corporations, N.Y.U. 21ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL 
TAXATION 715, 721 (1963). 
6. See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), which equated 
the term "property" in section 337 to the term "capital asset" as defined by section 
1221 and stated that since incompleted sales contracts were not capital assets, the 
proceeds received from their assignment are to be taxed as ordinary income despite 
section 337. This statement is broader than was required for a decision in the case. 
7. E.g., Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
373 U.S. 909 (1963); Family Record Plan, Inc., 36 T.C. 305 (1961) (reviewed by the 
court), afj'd on other grounds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962). 
8. E.g., Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 
U.S. 909 (1963). Plumbing &: Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 
1946). This doctrine is codified in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(b). 
9. In Central Bldg. &: Loan Assn., 34 T.C. 447 (1960), the Tax Court held that section 
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"property"10 to circumvent its application. This precedent arguably 
indicates that the tax benefit rule as well should take priority over 
section 337 and should require recognition of gain for amounts 
previously deducted. Moreover, the Tax Court has applied the tax 
benefit rule to override the nonrecognition provisions of section 
351,11 a section which, in terms of policy and coverage, is analogous 
to section 337.12 Thus, the language of section 337 should not by 
itself be considered dispositive of the issue in the principal case. To 
evaluate the court's decision properly, it is necessary to examine the 
legislative intent behind section 337. If Congress intended to tax an 
amount previously deducted and later recovered as part of a sale or 
exchange to which section 337 applies,13 the decision would appear 
to be inappropriate. 
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, if a corporation sold 
all of its assets to outsiders and then distributed the receipts of the 
sale to its shareholders in exchange for all their stock, the corpora-
tion was taxed on the gain from the sale.14 In addition, the share-
holders were subject to capital gains tax on any gain resulting from 
the exchange of their stock for the proceeds from the sale.15 Thus, 
this method of liquidation, which may be designated the sell-and-
distribute method, resulted in a double tax on what was essentially 
337 does not apply on the theory that the sale of a right to receive a future payment 
was not really a sale within the meaning of that section but instead was a collection. 
Although the income had already been earned by the taxpayer, its transfer was actually 
in the form of a sale of a right to receive a payment rather than a collection of the 
income already earned. See also J.E. Hawes Corp., 44 T.C. 705 (1965). 
IO. See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). Cf. Calley v. 
United States, 220 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.W.V. 1963), in which the definition of "property" 
in section 337 was interpreted by reference to the definition of "property" and "capital 
asset" in section 1221. See also Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation Under Section 337, 
76 HARV. L. REv. 780, 793 (1963) (discussion of the meaning of "property" for purposes 
of section 337). 
II. See Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98 (1968) and Bird Management, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 586 (1967), which adopt Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 CUM. 
BuLL. 139. Contra, Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d Ill (9th Cir. 1966). 
Section 351(a) provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized if property is 
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock 
or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or 
persons are in control ••. of the corporation." 
12. Both sections were motivated to a certain degree by a desire to remove the tax 
barriers which would otherwise discourage a change in the form in which a business is 
conducted. In both instances the nontax consequences are sufficient to discourage use 
of the provisions merely for tax avoidance. It should be noted that the need for a 
recapture provision is even greater in the section 337 situation, since there is a 
carryover of the basis of the transferred assets when an ongoing business is incorporated 
under section 351; thus the income element would usually be recognized eventually. 
13. The Internal Revenue Service clearly did intend to tax this gain. See Rev. Rul. 
61-214 supra note 5. 
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I, §§ Ill, 112(a), 53 Stat. 37; ch. 619, § 1170), 56 
Stat. 846 (1942). 
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I,§§ 111, 112(a), 53 Stat. 37. 
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the same gain.16 To avoid this result, some corporations began to 
distribute their assets in kind to their shareholders in exchange for 
all the shareholders' stock. Through this arrangement the distribu-
tion qualified for nonrecognition.17 The shareholders were taxed on 
any gain from the exchange of their stock for assets, but they were 
able to claim a basis in the distributed assets equal to their fair 
market value at the time of distribution and so could immediately 
sell to outsiders without realizing any taxable gain.18 By arranging 
the liquidation in this form, which may be designated the distribute-
and-sell method, the tax on the transaction with outside buyers was 
eliminated and only one tax was incurred on the gain arising from 
the sale of assets. 
For a widely held corporation, however, the distribute-and-sell 
method was impractical. There were difficulties both in the ap-
portionment of divisible assets among the shareholders and in the 
distribution of indivisible assets to them as tenants-in-common.19 
Widespread use of, and reliance upon, the distribute-and-sell method 
was further complicated by the Supreme Court's decisions in Com-
missioner v. Court Holding Co.20 in 1945 and in United States v. 
Cumberland Public Service Co.21 in 1950, both of which indicated 
that the determination of whether the assets were sold by the corpora-
tion or by its shareholders was a question of fact for the trial court. 
According to these cases, if upon consideration of the entire trans-
action the trial court found the shareholders to be selling merely on 
behalf of the corporation, the form of the transaction would be 
ignored and the corporation would be considered to have made 
the sale.22 
16. In the principal case, D. B. Anders Corporation was liquidated in this manner; 
the assets, including the rental items were sold to outsiders and the proceeds distributed 
to Anders, the sole shareholder, in exchange for his stock. Under the 1939 Code, this 
transaction would have been taxed twice, once at the corporate level on the gain from 
the sale of the assets to outsiders and once at the shareholder level on the gain from 
the distribution of proceeds. 
17. Treas. Reg. ll8, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953). See B. BITIKER &: J. EusnCE, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 9.61, at 379-80 (2d ed. 1966). 
18. The shareholders were taxed on the stock-for-asset exchange on the amount by · 
which the fair market value of the assets exceeded their basis in the stock. Int. Rev. 
Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ lll, ll2(a), 53 Stat. 37. The shareholders could then step up 
the basis in the assets to the fair market value at the time of distribution. This basis 
adjustment is explicit under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 334(a), but the same result was 
reached under the 1939 Code without explicit statutory authority. B. BITIKER &: 
J. Eusr1CE, supra note 17, at§ 9.04. 
19. Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation Under Section 337, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 780 
(1963). 
20. 324 U.S. 331. 
21. 338 U.S. 451. 
22. In Court Holding Co., a holding company owned by a husband and wife entered 
into negotiations for the sale of all its property at a time when title to the property 
was held by the corporation. An oral agreement was reached with the buyer, but 
before entering into a written contract, the corporation declared a "liquidating 
dividend," which consisted of a distribution of all of the property to the shareholders 
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Desiring to eliminate the formalistic distinctions created by the 
Court Holding and Cumberland cases, and recognizing the propriety 
of a single tax on the gain in the complete liquidation situation, 
Congress enacted section 337 as part of the 1954 Code. Section 337's 
primary purpose was to make the tax consequences of the sell-
and-distribute method the same as those of the distribute-and-sell 
method.23 Accordingly, if the tax benefit principle was applicable to 
the distribute-and-sell method when section 337 was adopted, Con-
gress must have intended that the principle also be applicable to 
the sell-and-distribute method such as that employed in the principal 
case.24 The decisive question, then, is whether or not the tax benefit 
rule had been applied to the distribute-and-sell method at the time 
of the enactment of section 337. 
Prior to the enactment of that section, no case had held that when 
a corporation distributed its assets to the shareholders in liquidation, 
the tax benefit rule required that the proceeds from the shareholders' 
subsequent sale of the assets be taxed to the corporation to the extent 
in exchange for all their stock. Shortly thereafter, the two former stockholders conveyed 
the property to the purchaser. The Supreme Court, affirming the Tax Court, looked 
past the form to the substance of the transaction and attributed the sale to the corpora-
tion rather than to the stockholder-distributors. The Court concluded: 
A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another 
by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true 
nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to 
alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax 
policies of Congress. 
324 U.S. at 334. 
In Cumberland Public Service Co., the Supreme Court reached a different result. 
In that case, the corporation had not been liquidated prior to the negotiations for the 
sale of the corporate assets; however, the Court distinguished Court Holding and 
found that the shareholders of Cumberland had negotiated in their personal capacities 
and not as agents of the corporation. The Court held that the gain from the sale should 
not be attributed to the corporation. 
The rule that emerged from these two cases was that gain from a sale by share-
holders of assets that had been distributed to them in liquidation would be ta.xed to 
the corporation as if the corporation had made the sale, unless the shareholders could 
demonstrate that they had negotiated and consummated the sale in their personal 
capacities and not as agents of the corporation. This rule created a dilemma for the 
shareholders. If they sought a buyer and negotiated a sale while the assets were still 
held by the corporation, they ran the risk of having the gain from the sale taxed to the 
corporation under the rule of Court Holding and the proceeds taxed to them as a 
distribution in exchange for stock. On the other hand, if the corporation distributed 
the assets to the shareholders before they had located a buyer or entered negotiations, 
the shareholders would be taxed on the distribution while it was still possible that a 
buyer would not be found or that negotiations would fail to materialize. 
23. See note 22 supra. It was largely this dilemma that precipitated the Congressional 
enactment of section 337 of the 1954 Code. See H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 
Al06 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954) (stating that "[t]he result 
is that undue weight is accorded the formalities of the transaction and they, therefore, 
represent merely a trap for the unwary.'') See also B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 
18, at § 9.64. 
24. It is doubtful that Congress would have intended to protect a broader class of 
assets under the sell-and-distribute method since this would result in formalistic 
distinctions of the type that prompted the enactment of section 337. 
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that the proceeds reflected an amount previously deducted. In Com-
missioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,25 the only case prior to 
1954 in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sought to tax a 
corporation on the recovery by the shareholders of an amount pre-
viously deducted by the corporation, the tax was imposed on a theory 
of assignment of income. Although the court in Stratford Bank in 
upholding the tax alluded to the tax benefit rule, it relied primarily 
on the assignment of income analysis.26 In 1954, then, there was no 
case authority for the proposition that the tax benefit principle ap-
plied to distribute-and-sell arrangements so as to tax the corporation 
25. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948), rev'g 8 T.C. 831 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 
(1948). 
26. The Stratford Bank distributed to its shareholders certain notes that the bank 
had written off as worthless in earlier years. At the time of this distribution, the notes 
were partially collectible. In deciding that the bank, rather than the shareholders, 
should be taxed on the amounts collected on the notes because the bank had actually 
earned whatever income was derived from the notes, the court stated: 
Even though the bank never received the money, it derived money's worth from 
the disposition of the notes which it used in place of money in procuring a 
satisfaction that was procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's 
worth. The enjoyment of the economic benefit was realized as completely as it 
would have been if the bank had collected the notes in dollars and cents and paid 
the money as a dividend to its shareholders. . •• 
• • • The acquisition of profits for its shareholders was the purpose of its creation. 
The collection of interest on loans was a principal source of its income. The 
payment of dividends to its shareholders was the enjoyment of its income. A body 
corporate can be said to enjoy its income in no other way. Like the "life-
rendering pelican," it feeds its shareholders upon dividends. 
168 F.2d at 1009. 
The facts in the Stratford Bank case differ significantly from those involved in the 
principal case. In Stratford Bank the stockholders, in collecting on the notes, were 
performing a function that the distributing corporation normally performed in the 
ordinary course of its business. Specifically, the shareholders were collecting income 
from the ordinary operation of the business and it was not the congressional intent 
that the word "property" be interpreted to allow a corporation to use nonrecognition 
provisions to avoid taxation on a sale or exchange which is representative of the 
ordinary course of business. See S. REP. No. 1,622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1954): "It is 
intended that during the 12-month period, sales in the ordinary course of business shall 
result in ordinary gain to the corporation as if the corporation were not in the process 
of liquidating." This policy, however, is not offended by the sale in the principal case. 
There the assets sold were not of a type which would have been sold in the ordinary 
course of business, and their sale by the corporation would not have given rise to 
ordinary income in the same manner as did collection of the notes by the Stratford 
Bank. 
Moreover, the partially collectible notes in Stratford Bank fit more comfortably into 
the traditional mold of the assignment-of-income cases than do the rental items of D.B. 
Anders Corporation. The prototypical assignment of income case is Helvering v. Horst, 
311 U.S. 112 (1940), in which bond interest coupons were assigned by the bondholders 
to a third person who collected them for his own benefit. In that case, the Supreme 
Court attributed the income to the bond holder. The assignment-of-income rationale has 
also been used in the area of receivables. For example, in Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 
309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962), modifying 35 T.C. 473 (1960), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 
(1963), a liquidating cash basis corporation sold accrued rights to compensation income 
and the court held the sales proceeds taxable despite section 337. The Ninth Circuit's 
language in that case indicates that the holding is based, at least in part, upon an 
assignment of income rationale. In Stratford Bank the partially collectible notes were 
like interest coupons and accounts receivable because the only thing remaining to be 
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on a previously deducted amount.27 Furthermore, there is nothing 
to indicate that Congress, at the time it enacted section 337, believed 
that the tax benefit rule would apply to the distribute-and-sell 
method. Because the nontax consequences of a complete liquidation 
serve tp deter its use for tax avoidance purposes, Congress could easily 
have felt that the application of the tax benefit rule was not necessary 
when liquidation involved a defunct corporation. 
Moreover, a fair implication of the passage of section 124528 in 
1962 is that Congress had not intended a tax benefit limitation to 
be imposed upon section 337. Section 1245 provides that gain from 
the sale of depreciable assets shall be recognized to the extent that 
it represents a recapture of amounts previously deducted for de-
preciation, and that such recognizable gain shall be taxed as ordinary 
income rather than as a capital gain. By explicitly overriding all 
other income tax sections of the Code,29 section 1245 reaches gains 
done for the production of income was collection; the transferor had, in effect, already 
earned the income. Thus, it was logical to apply the assignment of income rationale in 
that case. Obviously, the same would not be true of the rental items in the principal 
case. 
There are other less significant distinguishing features between Stratford Bank 
and the principal case. In the former, the bank did not actually distribute the notes to 
its shareholders but delivered them to one of its own employees who was to collect 
the proceeds and deposit them in a special account for the benefit of the shareholders. 
This factual pattern, not present in the principal case, may have influenced the court in 
Stratford Bank to adopt the assignment of income analysis since it appeared that the 
bank had not completely parted with dominion and control over the notes at the time 
of collection. Finally, unlike the rental items in the principal case, the notes in 
Stratford Bank were not distributed in the context of a partial or complete liquidation, 
but were a dividend in kind to the shareholders. 
27. In the principal case, the IRS was forced to rely on post-1954 cases involving the 
sale of intangibles such as contracts or accounts receivable. Most of these cases relied 
on an assignment of income theory rather than on a tax benefit approach. For example, 
in Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 305 (1961) (reviewed by the 
court), afj'd on other grounds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962), the tax court held that when 
a corporation which was on a cash basis sold contracts on which sums were due, and 
the corporation then liquidated, it had to recognize as income money received for the 
contracts since their sale constituted no more than a transfer of a right to receive 
income. See also Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), afj'g in 
part, rev'g in part, 42 T.C. 510 (1964); J.E. Hawes Corp., 44 T.C. 705 (1965); West 
Seattle Natl. Bank, 33 T.C. 341 (1959). For discussions of these cases, see generally 
B. BrrrKER &: J. EUSTICE, supra note 18, § 5.03, at 155-57; Boland, A Review of Develop-
ments Under Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 42 TAXES 676, 689-99 
(1964); Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation under Section 337, 76 HARV, L. REv. 780, 
791-98 (1963); Bonovitz, Restoration to Income of Bad Debt Reserves, 44 TAXES 300 
(1966). 
Some of the cases in which liquidating corporations have sold their accounts re-
ceivable and have been required to take their bad debt reserves into income despite 
section 337 have alluded to the tax benefit theory. See, e.g., West Seattle Natl. Bank, 
supra. The more recent cases, however, emphasize only the assignment of income con-
cept. E.g., J.E. Hawes Corp., supra. 
28. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1245. 
29. Id. §§ 1245(a)(l), (d). 
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from the sale or exchange of depreciable property to which section 
337 would otherwise apply. Congress' belief that it was necessary 
to include section 337 among those sections superseded by section 
124530 suggests that without the statutory priority provision it would 
be inappropriate for a court to impose a recapture limitation on sales 
or exchanges covered by section 337 .31 Consequently, with respect 
to the liquidation sale of property not covered by section 1245, such 
as that in the principal case, the recapture or tax benefit limitation 
seems to be inapplicable. 
Therefore, the Tax Court's decision in the principal case appears 
to be legally correct in terms of both the language and the purpose 
of section 337, and it is not surprising that the decision was later 
followed in Spitalny v. United States.32 Yet the necessary effect of 
these holdings in light of section 1245 is to create a distinction in 
the treatment of liquidation sales between the treatment of deprecia-
ble property and that of property the total cost of which was 
deductible as a business expense in the year of purchase (business 
expense property).33 Although this distinction does not affect the 
validity of the principal case or of Spitalny since those cases involved 
deficiencies for taxable years which ended before the effective date 
of section 1245,34 it could create an anomalous result in similar cases 
in the future. When depreciable property is liquidated and sold, 
section 1245 will override the nonrecognition provisions of section 
337 and the gain will be taxed to the extent of prior depreciation 
30. Indeed Treas. Reg. § I.1245-6(b) (1968) specifically lists section 337 as one of 
those sections which section 1245 was intended to override. This fact seems to indicate 
that the Treasury Department believed that without the priority provision in section 
1245 the liquidation sale of assets with respect to which depreciation deductions had 
been taken would be entitled to nonrecognition under section 337, irrespective of 
the recapture rules. 
31. Of course it is arguable that Congress' failure to exempt section 337 from the 
priority provision in section 1245 was an equivocal omission which expressed no view 
on the applicability of the recapture rules to a transaction to which section 337 applies. 
32. 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9602 (1968). Citing the principal case, the court refused to 
apply the tax benefit rule to preclude the nonrecognition of gain under section 337. 
Indeed, like the principal case, Spitalny involved the sale, pursuant to the sell-and-
distribute method of liquidation, of operating assets the cost of which had previously 
been deducted. The effect of the court's holding in both of these cases was to overturn 
Rev. Rul. 61-214, 1961-1 Cm.r. BuLL. 60 (1961). See note 5 supra. 
33. The determination of whether or not an item should be capitalized and thus 
depreciated under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167, or written off entirely as an 
expense under INT, REv, CODE of 1954, § 162, is based primarily on the useful 
life of the item. When the useful life is over one year the item would generally have 
to be depreciated; conversly, when its useful life is less than one year, the item may 
generally be treated as an ordinary and necessary business expense in the year of pur-
chase. 
34. The principal case and Spitalny involved deficiencies for taxable years which 
ended on July 31, 1961, and July 31, 1960, respectively. Section 1245 applies only to 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1962. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1245(a)(l). 
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deductions. But since section 1245 is expressly limited in its applica-
tion to property "of a character subject to the allowance for deprecia-
tion provided in section 167,"35 it does not require recapture when 
the total cost of the property is deducted in the year of purchase as 
an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162.36 In 
these situations, particularly in view of the decision in the principal 
case, the entire gain will fall within the nonrecognition provisions 
of section 337. This distinction between depreciable and business 
expense property seems to be unintended and wholly without merit.37 
The rationale of section 1245's priority over section 337 with respect 
to depreciable property is that recapture of an amount previously 
deducted should be taxed to the extent the prior deduction consti-
tuted a tax benefit. The same rationale would apply to gain from the 
liquidation sale of business expense property because it too repre-
sents the recapture of a previously deducted amount. Indeed, in 
other areas the recapture rationale is applied both to business expense 
and to depreciated property. In the charitable contributions area, for 
example, a contribution of business expense property is treated in 
essentially the same manner as a contribution of depreciable prop-
erty38 although the application of section 170 varies slightly depend-
ing on the type of property involved. In the liquidation context, 
however, Congress apparently overlooked the distinction that section 
35. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1245(a)(3). 
36. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 162, 167, and 1245. 
37. An attempt might be made to distinguish depreciable and business expense 
property on the grounds that the potential abuse, absent recapture provisions, is much 
greater in the depreciation area. However, even in light of the accelerated depreciation 
and bonus depreciation provisions, which are without counterparts in section 162, it 
would be difficult to make that argument in the principal case, for as the amount 
deducted and later recovered in that case was $233,000. Although the incentive devices 
built into section 167 often result in unrealistic charges in the first years of an asset's 
life, and although the possibility of forecasting error is much greater in estimating 
useful life of a fixed asset than in attempting to determine whether or not the useful 
life of an asset is greater than one year, the rationale behind recapture is still similar 
whether the original deduction was pursuant to section 162 or to section 167. This is 
evidenced by the fact that Congress in enacting section 1245 provided for the recapture 
of all depreciation, to the extent that there was gain on the sale, and not just for the 
accelerated or additional first year depreciation. If Congress had sought merely to 
prevent abuse of the incentive provisions, it would have been necessary to require 
recapture only to the extent that the deductions actually taken exceeded those that 
would have been taken under the straight line method. 
38. With respect to depreciable property, section 170(e) provides that the amount 
of any charitable contribution deduction be reduced by the amount which would have 
been treated as section 1245 or section 1250 gain if the property had been sold at its 
fair market value. With respect to business expense property, Treas. Reg. § 1.170-l(c)(I) 
(1968) provides that "[c]osts and expenses incurred in the year of contribution in 
producing or acquiring the contributed property are not deductible and are not part 
of the cost of goods sold." If the relevant expenses have been incurred in past years, 
an adjustment to cost of goods sold is required. Thus, section 170(e) results in what 
is essentially recapture and Treas. Reg. § 1.170-l(c)(I) (1968), by prohibiting the deduc-
tion, actually eliminates the need for recapture. 
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1245's priority would inadvertently create,39 for it is hard to imagine 
that such an anomalous distinction was intended. 
Thus, it might be argued that section 1245 was intended to apply 
to sales of business expense property as well as to sales of depreciable 
property. According to this argument, items which are deducted as 
business expenses, rather than depreciated, merely because their 
useful life to the taxpayer is less than one year, 40 should be treated 
as property "of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation" 
for purposes of application of section 1245. Unfortunately, this argu-
ment has been weakened by the issuance of Revenue Ruling 68-104.41 
This ruling, made in a nonliquidation setting, held that when a 
corporation sold laundry items the total cost of which had been 
deducted as a business expense in the year of purchase rather than 
being depreciated, gain from the sale is taxable to the corporation 
as ordinary income because of the tax benefit rule and section 111. 
The ruling specifically stipulated that the laundry's rental items 
would be included in such business expense property, for they were 
not depreciable assets within the meaning of section 167.42 If the IRS 
should now attempt to apply section 1245 in a factual situation 
similar to that in the principal case, it will have to contend with its 
own ruling that business expense items are not depreciable property. 
Thus, section 1245 cannot apply to gain from the sale of those items, 
and so the anomaly between the treatment of depreciable property 
and that of business expense property persists. 
In light of these considerations, it is submitted that the anomaly 
should be eliminated by Congress.43 For example, section 337 could 
be amended to provide that gain will be recognized by the corpora-
tion to the extent that it represents a recapture of a previously 
deducted amount. As an alternative, Congress could enact an ana-
logue to section 1245, providing that gain from the sale of assets the 
39. The court in the principal case suggested this idea. See principal case at 823. 
40. See note 33 supra. 
41. 1968 INT. REV. BULL., No. 9, at 14. 
42. The ruling is not inconsistent with the principal case because it was concerned 
with a nonliquidation situation, and thus the nonrecognition provisions of section 337 
were not brought into conflict with the tax benefit rationale of section lll. If the 
ruling were codified, however, without a limitation to the nonliquidation setting and 
a priority provision similar to that in section 1245, it would dispose of the principal 
case and would dictate a contrary result. As it stands, the courts are free to refuse to 
follow the ruling or to follow it subject to explicit nonrecognition provisions of the 
code, such as section 337. 
43. See Spitalny v. United States 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9602 (1968), quoting from 
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, 324 F.2d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1963): 
"It may be that if Congress had considered the problem now before us • • • it 
would have inserted language designed to reach • • • the results here sought by the 
Commissioner. But it did not do so ••.• If the result here is undesirable, the remedy 
is for Congress, not the courts." See also Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966); B. Bl.Tl'KER &: J. EUSTICE, supra note 18, § 9.63, at 386. 
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total cost of which had been deducted in the year of purchase as an 
ordinary and necessary business expense would be taxable as ordinary 
income, notwithstanding any other provision of the Code.44 
44. It is possible that courts could apply Rev. Rul. 68-104, 1968 INT. REv. BULL,, 
No. 9, at 14, and could then use section 111 in nonliquidation and perhaps even in 
liquidation situations, to avoid the result in the principal case. It is also possible in 
future cases that courts might apply section 1245 to sales of business expense property. 
However, in the interest of uniformity and consistency, the result would be better 
achieved through Congressional enactment. 
